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The phrase “social justice” has become loaded when used in Catholic circles.  
Some Catholics are described pejoratively as ‘social justice Catholics’ when they 
appear to have more interest in political matters and left-leaning politics than the 
evangelical mission of the Church or the Church’s liturgy. At the same time, supporters 
of a broadly free economy are often accused of ignoring the social teaching of the 
Church and, it is sometimes argued, their views are incompatible with Catholicism if 
they sympathise with the ideas of F. A. Hayek who wrote a renowned critique of the 
idea of social justice.  
The purpose of this paper is to try to cut shed some light on these matters and change 
the tenor of debate. There is more detail in the paper on the website. And that paper 
is one of a series of two or three papers on this topic that are in development.  
Hayek’s critique of social justice 
So, let me begin by talking about Hayek’s critique of social justice in volume two of 
Law, Legislation and Liberty which was called The Mirage of Social Justice.  
Hayek argues that the concept of social justice is meaningless in a ‘great society’ or 
‘extended order’. This is because the outcome of a market economy is not intended 
by anybody. It is the result of a process of social co-operation. As long as the rules by 
which the participants act are just, the outcome is simply the result of a huge number 
of uncoordinated decisions. 
This particular argument has been criticised by Professor Lord Plant. However, there 
are other arguments which I think are more difficult to dismiss. Hayek argues that 
social justice is a left-over from a bygone era when persons lived in small groups within 
which it was possible to think of resources being shared out according to principles 
that might be regarded as ‘just’: perhaps depending on need or the contribution of 
individuals to obtaining the resources that were available for allocation, and so on. 
So, it might be possible (and I will come back to this) to think of a firm or a family 
applying principles of social justice. But the idea that a country of 300 million people 
can somehow distribute the goods of the country according to “just principles” is 
fanciful, it is argued.  
How would the principle of distribution be determined? Different people will have 
different views on the principles that should be applied, never mind disagreement 
about their application in particular cases. How should we take into account an 
assessment of somebody’s contribution to producing the total output of society? Is it 
just to reward intelligence (the distribution of which is a matter of luck)? To what extent 
should hard work be rewarded and how do we measure it? Are some of the poor more 
undeserving than others? In what proportions do we apply these principles? The 
problem of distribution, which can be resolved, according to Hayek, by people acting 
co-operatively within a market economy just cannot be resolved objectively in the great 
society. It cannot be argued that they are resolved by voting and elections because 
that simply raises the question of whether an outcome is just simply because a majority 
of people (or the largest minority of people) agree with it.  
As it happens, Hayek did not disagree with policies designed to ensure that the poor 
had enough to live on and be integrated into society, perhaps going beyond the level 
of state redistribution proposed in Rerum Novarum. However, he would not describe 
the process of bringing this about as one of promoting social justice. 
Hayek also argues that the pursuit of social justice can be used to justify almost any 
intervention by the state and that those interventions would undermine the whole idea 
of a free society governed by rules of just conduct. If, for example, we were to base 
social justice on equality of opportunity, how can that be achieved without intimate 
interventions in family life? It is worth noting that papal teaching has actually made 
similar points. 
In his attack on social justice, Hayek, not surprisingly, critiqued the purveyors of the 
idea and this included Catholic writers. Hayek argued that the phrase social justice 
had been taken over by most ‘teacher and preachers of morality’. He even related this 
Hayek related this tendency to a loss of faith in the supernatural by the most important 
Christian denominations and made special reference to the Catholic Church. In most 
of the rest of this presentation, I am going to examine those Catholic writers and 
documents.  
I should add at this point that this part of the paper is more the result of my co-authors 
work so I may not be able to answer detailed questions on it. 
What did social justice mean in Catholic writings and teaching? 
Hayek traced the Catholic origins of social justice back to Taparelli and also referred 
to Rosmini.  
The meaning of social justice expressed in Taparelli’s work is complex. Taparelli 
defines social justice as ‘justice between man and man’. This includes equality under 
the law, but definitely not equality of outcomes.  
For Taparelli, however, the reach of social justice is intended to go beyond equality 
before the law. It relates to the Thomist concept of ‘the perpetual and constant will to 
render to each one his right’. Taparelli, it would appear, intended social justice to be a 
new term for a well-established aspect of justice which is the virtue by which the citizen 
by which he or she directs his or her conduct towards promoting the common good of 
the community. The state might be involved, but this was not intended only to be the 
role of the state: indeed, not even mainly the role of the state. Although the operation 
of social justice might lead to a more equitable distribution of goods, social justice 
explicitly was not the process by which goods were redistributed by a central authority.  
The operation of social justice applies to the individual, the family, all institutions, the 
city, the state and to international society as well as to the Church. It also applies to 
businesses – especially perhaps in the current era. It has been described in one work 
as “that disposition of the will which inclines individuals and groups to work for the 
common good of the communities of which they are parts.” It goes beyond the rather 
specific demands of commutative justice. 
The second Catholic philosopher cited by Hayek was Rosmini. Again, I do not know a 
great deal about Rosmini’s philosophy, but a brief reading suggests that his outlook 
was rather Hayekian (whereas Taparelli was a conservative – and neither were 
socialists). Rosmini strongly defended property rights, proportional taxes and attacked 
policies of redistribution. Indeed, Rosmini’s way of describing social justice was as “to 
each what he owns” and the inviolability of property.  
Two Church documents were cited by Hayek. Rerum Novarum was not cited but, 
interestingly, both the drafter of that document and Pope Leo XIII were students of 
Taparelli. And you can certainly see social justice poking through the document even 
though the term is not used.  
Quadragesimo Anno, was cited by Hayek. This was published in 1931. Social justice 
is mentioned explicitly on nine occasions in the encyclical and there is a detailed 
discussion of the concept. Yet, in the discussion of social justice, there is no explicit 
role for the state mentioned at all (which is not to say one was not intended). Examples 
of the idea of social justice in the encyclical would include the requirement on 
employers to pay a “just wage” sufficient for a family to live on. Nell-Breuning, the 
drafter of Quadragesimo Anno, argued that the encyclical ‘has finally and definitively 
established, theologically canonized, so to speak, social justice’. Perhaps Hayek was 
aware of this when he made his point about ‘teachers and preachers of morality’. 
Divini Redemptoris followed Quadragesimo Anno and was intended as an attack on 
communism. In this encyclical, it was suggested that social justice could not be 
satisfied until all people had sufficient to exercise their proper social functions. There 
are shades of state redistribution here, but, in fact, the intention is that this would 
generally happen because of other actors behaving in a socially just manner.  
Indeed, this encyclical argued that action by employers and the creation of 
professional associations and other bodies in society would be the means by which 
social justice was brought about – Centesimus Annus argued similarly in relation to 
employment rights.  
I am definitely claiming that the Church’s concept of social justice is somehow 
Hayekian. It is not. However, Hayek Catholic thinking on social justice is not what 
Hayek was attacking. It is a conversation on parallel lines. There may well have been 
grounds on which Hayek could have criticised the idea of social justice as it developed 
in Catholic social teaching, but social justice is clearly not the process of the state 
distributing the goods of the world according to some agreed principles of justice 
(equality, contribution, desert etc) which was the target of The Mirage of Social Justice.  
So, my first conclusion is about academic charity. Those who criticise ‘social justice 
Catholics’ might better spend their time exploring and explaining what the concept was 
intended to mean – and its interpretation is not that easy. They might actually find 
themselves on stronger ground because ‘social justice Catholics’ very often 
misinterpret the term just as Hayek did. Secondly, those who argue that people who 
follow the ideas of F. A. Hayek are not automatically excluding themselves from 
Catholic social teaching circles because, though Hayek cited Catholic authors, he 
missed his target. He was criticising a later meaning of the term which was not the 
Catholic meaning.  
Social justice – practical examples 
I wanted to finish with some practical example of what social justice might actually 
mean or might be operationalised, mainly in the world of business. They are important 
‘social justice actors’.  
Let’s just remind ourselves what the concept means. It relates to those aspects of 
justice that promote the common good of the whole society – it is not simply about 
rendering unto people that which is agreed in contract. Our view, as authors of this 
paper, is that the concept needs more practical examples to help illuminate an idea 
which is not that well defined and which is mentioned in passing more than it is dwelled 
upon.  
An employer who pays a worker less than another because he is black probably does 
not offend commutative justice, but he certainly offends social justice. The action has 
ramifications beyond the individuals involved and it undermines the common good of 
the whole community. This is the case even if the worker does not know he is being 
paid less.  
Another example of the absence of social justice might arise where an employer hires 
an employee at a low wage by free agreement (thus fulfilling the demands of 
commutative justice), but where that wage is less than that of other employees who 
contribute as much to the enterprise. This may happen because the lower-paid 
employee is ignorant of market conditions or prevented from moving to a competing 
employer by family circumstances. Catholic teaching would argue that the employee 
is a victim of social injustice. It would not generally be a matter for the state, but it 
would certainly be a manifestation of the absence of virtue and of unjust treatment. It 
would be a matter for other bodies in society (professional associations, unions etc). 
A farmer who diverts a stream the ownership of which is clearly shared, thus requiring 
a neighbouring farmer to sink a borehole at great cost, offends particular and 
commutative justice, but he does not principally act against social justice. On the other 
hand, a mining company that poisons the water supply of a whole village without 
consultation or compensation offends social justice because it prevents the villagers 
from obtaining a living that is due to them. The company may or may not offend 
commutative justice or commit a tort depending on the ownership rights that exist.  
Bribes used to gain entry to a university or corruption in public life more generally are 
offences against social justice because they are actions that are orientated against the 
common good of the whole society. They may, in fact, harm no particular individual 
and they may or may not be illegal and they may or may not offend other aspects of 
justice. Similarly, it would be reasonable to describe an admissions tutor of a university 
who made judgements about whether to admit students on the basis of how attractive 
he found them as acting ‘unjustly’. The same could apply to discrimination on the 
grounds of race which is specifically raised in the section of the Catechism on social 
justice. However, it is not self-evident that this sort of behaviour should in every 
circumstance be the subject of state law enforced by the political authority. It could, 
though, be regarded as an aspect of justice and it would not be unreasonable to 
describe it as ‘social justice’. Such rules of justice operating in non-political society 
would be distinct from acts of charity.  
A further aspect of the sphere of social justice has been suggested by Rhonheimer. 
He argued that that governments that grant legal privileges or indulge in corrupt 
behaviour that prevent entry into markets would be indicative of an absence of justice 
in the social and economic sphere. Indeed, Hayek notes that the classical liberal 
movement has regarded as appropriate the removal of man-made obstacles to the 
rise of individuals, the abolition of legal privileges and that, where the state contributed 
to improving somebody’s condition, they should do so in a way that did not 
discriminate. This is not far from an important aspect of Rhonheimer’s conception of 
social justice and is an aspect of justice frequently referred to in Catholic teaching, 
including in Pope Francis’ critiques of how capitalism is perceived to operate in many 
countries. Ronheimer’s perspective is also close to Taparelli’s example of equality 
before the law being an important example of social justice. 
Conclusion 
It is quite clear from our analysis that, when Hayek was critiquing and criticising the 
concept of social justice, he had in mind a concept quite different from the ideas of the 
19th century Catholic thinkers and 20th century papal teaching documents to which he 
referred. Since 1938, the idea of social justice in Catholic teaching has evolved 
somewhat. It has sometimes been used to refer to a wider set of policies perhaps 
including policies of income redistribution which were the main target of ‘Mirage’, 
though its meaning is often not entirely clear.  
The fact that Hayek missed the target when firing his ammunition at Catholic writers 
and teaching documents is important in current debate.  
A strong commitment to the Church’s teaching on social justice properly understood 
does not indicate whether somebody stands on the political left or has a belief in free 
markets. It is certainly clear that, as the term found its way into Catholic social teaching 
in the 1930s, a role for the state was intended in the promotion of social justice. But 
what that role was is ambiguous and the role proposed is not obviously synonymous 
with the role for the state proposed by modern social democrats.  
There is, however, clearly a strong role for business in the promotion of social justice 
as understood by the Church. And the fulfilment of that role is crucial to the promotion 
of the common good in society as a whole.  
